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SPECIALIST PAYMENT SCHEMES AND PATIENT SELECTION IN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC HOSPITALS
Specialist Payment Schemes and Patient




It has been observed that specialist physicians who work in private hos-
pitals are usually paid by fee-for-service while specialist physicians who work
in public hospitals are usually paid by salary. This paper provides an expla-
nation for this observation. Essentially, fee-for-service aligns the interests
of income preferring specialist with proﬁt maximizing private hospitals and
results in private hospitals treating a high proportion of short stay patients.
On the other hand, salary aligns the interests of fairness preferring special-
ists with welfare maximizing public hospital and results in public hospitals
treating all patients irrespective of their length of stay.
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1. Introduction
In a recent study, Simoens and Giuﬀrida (2004), remarked that “OECD
countries generally pay specialist physicians by either salary or fee-for-service,
with salary payment being more common in the public sector.” The recent
eﬃciency-selection literature, Ellis and McGuire (1986), Newhouse (1996),
Ma and McGuire (1997), and Chalkley and Malcomson (1998), has exam-
ined the choice of payment scheme by a purchaser of health services and in
the context of specialist physicians found that payment by salary induces
physicians to under-supply services or select low cost patients. On the other
hand, fee-for-service induces specialist physicians to over-supply services. In
this literature, hospitals can be proﬁt maximizing (private), as in Ellis and
McGuire (1986), or have a benevolent component (public), as in Chalkley
and Malcomson (1998), but the interaction between these two types of hos-
pitals in a mixed private / public system is not considered. Therefore, this
literature is unable to explain the above remark by Simoens and Giuﬀrida
that salary payment is more common in the public sector.
This paper develops a model that predicts private hospitals oﬀer special-
ist physicians fee-for-service while public hospitals oﬀer payment by salary.
In this model, there are two types of patients who have diﬀerent expected
lengths of stay. There are two types of hospitals, private (proﬁt maximizing)
and public (welfare maximizing). The utility functions of specialist physi-
cians diﬀer according to the weight attached to income and fairness, where
fairness involves treating all patients the same regardless of type. A critical
assumption is that private hospital proﬁt is a concave function of length of
stay, that is, more proﬁt is earned from the patients ﬁrst day in hospital
than the second and so on.
Given the concavity of proﬁt with respect to length of stay, the private
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hospital maximizes proﬁt by admitting as many short length of stay patients
as possible. However, the private hospital can not observe patient type and
it is assumed that it can not write contracts with specialists specifying that
they only admit short stay patients. By oﬀering specialists fee-for-service,
the private hospital attracts specialist who place relatively more weight on
income, Proposition 1, and these specialists admit a high proportion of short
stay patients as this maximizes their income, Proposition 2. Essentially, fee-
for-service aligns the interests of income liking specialists with those of the
private hospital.
On the other hand, the public hospital maximizes welfare and does this
by treating all patients equally and not discriminating between them accord-
ing to type. By oﬀering a payment of salary, the public hospital attracts
specialists who place relatively more weight on fairness, Proposition 1, and
these specialist admit all patients regardless of type. In this case, payment
by salary has aligned the interests of fairness liking specialists with those of
the public hospital.
These results complement the existing literature on specialist physician
payment schemes by showing that in addition to providing incentives for
appropriate treatment they also provide a mechanism whereby the hospitals
and the specialists interests, with regard to patient mix, can be aligned.
2. Participants
2.1. Patients
There are two types of patients, 1 and 2. Both have medical condition k for
which they seek treatment. Type 1 patients only have condition k while type
2 patients have additional medical conditions to condition k. The proportion
of type 1 patients in the population of those with condition k is θ1 and the
27
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proportion of type 2 patients is θ2 = 1 − θ1. Every period, K new patients
have condition k.
Let l ∈ (0,L] be the length of stay in hospital and fi(l), i = 1,2 be the
probability density function for a type i patient. Let Fi(l) be the probability
that v ≤ l, that is Fi(l) =
� l
0 fi(v)dv. It is assumed that F2 has ﬁrst-order
stochastic dominance over F1, that is,
1−F1(l) ≤ 1−F2(l), all l ∈ (0,L] with 1−F1(l) < 1−F2(l), some l ∈ (0,L].
(1)
In words, the probability that a patient has a length of stay greater than l is
greater for a type 2 patient than a type 1 patient. The rationale being that
a type 2 patient has extra medical conditions that lead to a longer period
of recovery following treatment. Given these assumptions, it is well known
that a type 2 patient has a longer expected length of stay than a type 1
patient, that is,
E2(l) > E1(l), (2)
where E is the expectation operator. For simplicity, E1(l) is normalized to
1.
It is assumed that all patients are indiﬀerent between which specialist
treats them and in what type of hospital they are treated. In addition, all
patients are assumed to suﬀer disutility from being referred to a specialist
that on observing their type, refuses to treat them.1
2.2. General Practitioner
It is assumed that the general practitioner acts in the patients interest, that
is, acts to maximize the patients’ utility. Therefore, the general practitioner
1This disutility arises because of the delay in treatment that such a referral causes, or
because of the inconvenience of attending an additional specialist appointment.
38
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acts to minimize the extent of treatment delays and inconvenience through
there choice of referral specialist.
2.3. Private Hospital
It is assumed that private hospital proﬁt, π, from treating a patient is a
function of length of stay, π(l), with π�(l) > 0 and π��(l) < 0. That is,
private hospital proﬁt increases with length of stay but at a decreasing rate.
The rationale for this assumption being that more hospital services are used
on the ﬁrst day in hospital, operating theatres, staﬀ, etc. and so more proﬁt
is generated than on the following days in hospital with the least amount of
services used and proﬁt generated on the last day in hospital.2 It is assumed
that the capacity of the private hospital is ﬁxed at Npri beds and that the
private hospital maximizes proﬁt.
2.4. Public Hospital
The public hospital is assumed to be indiﬀerent about the type of patient ad-
mitted to it. This is consistent with notions of equity of access and fairness.3
The capacity of the public hospital is ﬁxed at Npub beds. It is assumed that




The ﬁrst term on the right hand side of (3) is the number of new sick
patients every period and the second term is the expected number of type
two patients that are still being treated from previous periods. Condition
2Carey (2000) demonstrates that length of stay reductions yield greater cost saving in
hospitals that have smaller length of stays than those that have larger length of stays.
This is evidence that more hospital services are used in the ﬁrst day of stay than the last.
A similar result can be found in Polverejan et al (2003) and in Evans (1984, p193). If it
is assumed that proﬁt is generated in proportion to services provided, then more proﬁt is
generated on the ﬁrst day of the stay than the second, and so on. This proﬁt should be
distinguished from accounting proﬁt as the latter depends very much on how the hospital
is reimbursed.
3In the terminology of Chalkley and Malcomson (1998 p15), the public hospital is a
benevolent hospital and “it is supposed to be treating all those who want treatment.”
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(3) states that the total number of beds in hospitals of any type equals the
total expected number of patients requiring beds.4
2.5. Specialists
Specialists observe patient type and maximize utility which is not only a
function of their income, but also a function of the extent to which they
treat all patients equally regardless of type. The latter reﬂects the specialists
preferences over fairness, to some extent all patients are worthy of treatment
by them. To capture these two inﬂuences it is assumed that specialists
utility functions are a weighted average of income and a measure of fairness.5
Specialist j�s income, Y, is a function of the number of patients of each type





i as the number of type i patients
a specialist expects to treat if the specialist does not discriminate between
patients. That is, the specialist acts fairly. Fairness, Z, is measured by the
extent that the specialist’s choices of n1 and n2 deviate from n∗
1 and n∗
2.































2 . The functions
Y (·) and Z(·) are the same for all specialists.
The total number of specialists is given by M and α is distributed over
[0,1] with density g(α) and distribution function G(α).
4Although the total number of hospital beds is exogenous in this paper, (3) can be
viewed as a long run equilibrium condition.
5The assumption that specialists care about their patients’ welfare is common in the
literature and can be found in Chalkley and Malcomson (1998), Ellis and McGuire (1986)
and Ma and McGuire (1997).
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3. The Game
In the ﬁrst stage, the private and public hospitals choose payment schemes
for specialists. These schemes are restricted to be either (i) a ﬁxed salary,
or (ii) fee-for-service. In the second stage, specialists choose in which type
of hospital to work. In stage three, specialists choose which type of patients
to treat and in stage four, general practitioners choose which specialist to
refer a particular type of patient to.
3.1. Stage Four - General Practitioner Referral
The general practitioner observes patient type, knows where each specialist
works, and what type of patients they accept. They are assumed to act in
the patients interest and so choose referral specialist to minimize delays in
treatment and inconvenience. Therefore, if a specialist only accepts type 1
patients, then general practitioners never refer type 2 patients to them. It
turns out that diﬀerent specialists accept diﬀerent proportions of type 1 and
2 patients and so an individual general practitioner might refer a patient to
a specialist who already is treating their preferred number of that type of
patient. To avoid complication and given this stage of the game is not the
central focus of the paper, it is assumed that the referral process is optimal
in the sense that patients are referred to specialists who will accept them as
patients.
3.2. Stage Three - Specialist Choice of Patients to Treat
Given payments schemes and the type of hospital at which the specialist
works, the specialist chooses which type/s of patients to treat.
Private Hospital: Assume that the private hospital allocates all specialists
A ≤ Npri beds for T periods. The specialist’s choice of the numbers of
611
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2E2(l) = AT. (5)
Substituting this constraint into the specialist’s utility function, gives utility












where z reaches a maximum at n
j
1 = n∗















(i) Fixed Salary, S: The specialist’s income is independent of the type of
patient treated so y(n
j
1) = S. If specialist j cares about fairness at all,
αj < 1, then specialist j will choose n
j
1 = n∗
1, that is, the specialist will not
discriminate between types of patients. In fact, even if αj = 1, given S is
ﬁxed, the specialist will not discriminate between patients. The specialist’s
maximized utility is vj = αjS + (1 − αj)z(0).
ii) Fee-for-Service: Assume that all patients, regardless of type, pay the
same fee to the specialist for treatment. In this case, Y = n1 + n2, where






(a) If αj = 1, the specialist only values income and chooses n
j
1 to maxi-
mize yj. As E2(l) > 1, (1− 1





is monotonically increasing in
n
j
1. Therefore, income is maximized with n
j
1 = AT and n
j
2 = 0. Maximized
utility is vj = AT.





Maximized utility is vj = z(0).









1 . As αj varies between
712
SPECIALIST PAYMENT SCHEMES AND PATIENT SELECTION IN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC HOSPITALS
0 and 1, n
j
1 varies between n∗














Public Hospital: The problem for a specialist working in the public hospital
is identical in structure to that of a specialist working in the private hospital.
3.3. Stage Two - Specialist Choice of Hospital to Work At
Given the payment schemes oﬀered by each type of hospital, the specialist
works at that hospital which yields the greatest utility. Essentially the choice
is not between hospitals, but between payment schemes. Specialist j will
choose to work under fee-for-service if
αjy(n
j
1(αj)) + (1 − αj)z(n
j
1(αj) − n∗
1) ≥ αjS + (1 − αj)z(0). (9)
The LHS of (9) is maximized utility under fee-for-service while the RHS is
maximized utility under salary.
Maximized utility under salary is a linear function of αj, as S and z(0)
are constants. It has slope S −z(0) and is shown in Figure 1. It is assumed
that S > z(0).
Using familiar techniques it can be shown that maximized utility under
fee-for-service is a convex function of αj. Applying the envelope theorem,








It is assumed that AT > S and that y(n∗
1) < S. The ﬁrst assumption
guarantees that at αj = 1 maximized utility under fee-for-service is greater
than under salary, while the latter assumption guarantees that at αj = 0
813
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the slope of maximized utility under fee-for-service is less than under salary.
Maximized utility under fee-for-service is also drawn in Figure 1.
As drawn, Figure 1 reveals that there is an ¯ α deﬁned by ¯ αy(n1(¯ α)) +
(1− ¯ α)z(n1(¯ α)−n∗
1) ≡ ¯ αS +(1− ¯ α)z(0) such that for those specialists with
¯ α ≤ αj ≤ 1 fee-for-service is preferred to salary while for those specialists
with 0 ≤ αj < ¯ α salary is preferred to fee-for-service. Note that ¯ α(S) is an
increasing function of S. This is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: Given S > z(0), AT > S, and y(n∗
1) < S, specialists
who attach a relatively high weight to income, ¯ α ≤ αj ≤ 1, prefer to work
under fee-for-service while specialists who attach a relatively high weight to
fairness, 0 ≤ αj < ¯ α, prefer to work under salary.
914
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Figure 1
Salary vs. Fee-for-Service
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3.4. Stage One - Hospital Choice of Specialist Payment Scheme
Private Hospital: First consider the problem of a private hospital if it could
choose the numbers and types of patients it treats. In this case, the private
hospital chooses the number of patients of each type to maximize expected




EΠpri ≡ n1E1(π) + n2E2(π) (11)
subject to
n1 + n2E2(l) = NpriT, (12)
where Ei(π) =
� L
0 π(l)fi(l) i = 1,2. Substituting the constraint yields
max
n1














) > 0, (14)
because E1(π) > E2(π) >
E2(π)
E2(l) . The ﬁrst inequality follows from the sto-
chastic dominance of F2 over F1 and the concavity of π(l). The second
follows because E1(l) = 1 < E2(l). Therefore, the solution is to make n1 as
large as possible, that is, n1 = NpriT, and n2 = 0. As expected, the proﬁt
maximizing solution is to ﬁll the hospital with as many type 1 patients as
possible because they have greater turnover and more proﬁt is generated at
the beginning of a hospital stay than the end.
Now, the private hospital does not choose patient type as it does not
observe it. The specialist observes it. It is assumed that it is too costly
for the private hospital to write contracts with specialists that specify the
type of patients that can be admitted. The stochastic nature of length of
stay means that even if a specialist did choose to admit only type 1 patients
1116
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This consumer will choose to purchase insurance if EUI ≥ EUpriv, that is,
if
ln(wi − ρp) ≥ (1 − ρ)lnwi + ρln(wi − p). (20)
This inequality holds for all wi because of the concavity of ln(x). Therefore,
all consumers who if sick would choose to be treated in a private hospital in
the absence of insurance choose to purchase insurance in its presence and if
sick choose to be treated in a private hospital.
Now consider a consumer, who has no insurance, and if sick chooses to
be treated in a public hospital. The expected utility of this consumer is









This consumer will choose to purchase insurance if EUI ≥ EUpub, that is,
if
ln(wi − ρp) + ρH(q) ≥ lnwi + ρH(0). (22)
Rearranging yields
wi ≥ ρ ·
expρh(q)
expρh(q) −1
· p = θI(q) · p, (23)
where θI(q) = ρ ·
expρh(q)
expρh(q) −1. Now θI(q) < θ(q), because ρ < 1, so some
consumers who if sick chose to be treated in a public hospital in the absence
of insurance, choose to purchase insurance in its presence and choose to be
treated in a private hospital if sick. The preceding discussion is summarized
in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: Given pq, q, and pd, those consumers, who in the absence
of insurance, chose to be treated in a private hospital if sick, in the presence
of insurance, choose to purchase insurance and if sick choose to be treated
in a private hospital. In addition, some consumers, who in the absence of
1217
SPECIALIST PAYMENT SCHEMES AND PATIENT SELECTION IN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC HOSPITALS
salary, Se, is such that private hospital demand for specialists equals the







The left hand side of (16) is private hospital demand for specialists while
the right hand side is the supply of specialists to the private hospital. An
excess supply of specialists to the private hospital is equivalent to an excess
demand for specialists by the public hospital. In this case, S would increase,
and so ¯ α would increase until the excess supply of specialists to the private
hospital is eliminated.
Proposition 1 required that AT > S and y(n∗
1) < S. As long as there are
both private and public hospital beds, these conditions will be satisﬁed in
equilibrium. If AT ≤ S, then all specialists would want to work for salary
in the public hospital, there would be an excess supply of specialists to the
public hospital.6 If y ≥ S, then all specialists would want to work for fee-for-
service in the private hospital, there would be an excess supply of specialists
to the private hospital.7 Therefore, in equilibrium AT > Se and y(n∗
1) < Se.
The above is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2: In equilibrium, Npri
A specialists work in the private hospital
for fee-for-service while Npub
A specialists work in the public hospital and are
paid a salary of Se. The proportion of type 1 patients treated at the private
hospital is greater than the population proportion θ1.
In equilibrium, specialists who work in private proﬁt maximizing hospi-
tals are paid fee-for-service and treat a high proportion of type 1 patients,
patients with only one condition. This maximizes not only the proﬁt of
the private hospital, but also the utility of these specialists as they weigh
6If AT ≤ S, the concavity of v(α) ensures y(n
∗
1) < S.
7If y ≥ S, the concavity of v(α) ensures AT > S.
1318
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income relatively more highly than fairness. Fee-for-service aligns the in-
terests of these specialists with those of the private hospital. On the other
hand, specialist who work in the public hospital are paid a salary and do not
discriminate between the type of patients they treat. These specialists weigh
fairness relatively more highly than income. Salary aligns the interests of
these specialists with those of the public hospital.
These results complement those found in Ellis and McGuire (1986),
where proﬁt maximizing hospitals that receive a prospective payment have
an incentive to employ specialists that place little weight on patient wel-
fare. These specialists order few hospital services and so are very proﬁtable
from the hospitals perspective. On the other hand, hospitals that receive
cost-plus reimbursement have an incentive to employ specialists that place
a lot of weight on patient welfare as these specialists order many hospital
services and so are very proﬁtable. Ellis and McGuire stress the importance
of how the hospital is paid in determining which specialists it would like to
hire. The current paper stresses the importance of how specialists are paid
in determining which specialists diﬀerent types of hospitals hire.
4. Conclusion
This paper has shown that hospitals can select their patient mix by oﬀering
specialists diﬀerent payment schemes. In equilibrium, proﬁt maximizing pri-
vate hospitals oﬀer fee-for-service and employ specialist who value income
more highly than fairness. To maximize income these specialists admit short
stay patients to the private hospital and so also maximize the proﬁt of the
private hospital. Fee-for-service aligns the interests of income preferring spe-
cialists with those of the private hospital. On the other hand, in equilibrium,
welfare maximizing public hospitals oﬀer payment by salary and employ spe-
1419
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cialists who value fairness more highly than income. To maximize utility,
these specialists admit patients of all types without discrimination and so
also maximize the objective function of the public hospital. Salary aligns the
interests of fairness preferring specialists with those of the public hospital.
In the traditional selection literature, payment by salary leads income
preferring specialists to select low cost patients (ones who require little eﬀort
or services) as this increases there surplus. Assuming patients that are low
cost to the specialist are also low cost and so highly proﬁtable to a hospital,
suggests proﬁt maximizing private hospitals should oﬀer specialists payment
by salary. This is not the prediction of this paper. The diﬀerence arises
because this paper assumes the specialist puts in the same eﬀort or supplies
the same services regardless of patient type. In this paper, it is fee-for-service
that leads the income preferring specialist to select patients that are most
proﬁtable to the proﬁt maximizing private hospital. This paper, therefore,
complements the existing selection literature.
A crucial assumption in this paper has been that the private hospital
allocates all specialists the same ﬁxed number of beds, A. Clearly it would
prefer to allocate more beds to doctors with a greater preference for income
as more short stay patients would be admitted to it. However, once this
insight is gained nothing further is added, except a lot of complication, by
making the number of beds allocated to specialists endogenous.
This paper has a number of interesting empirical implications. The ﬁrst
is that in a mixed private / public hospital system, patients with few com-
plicating conditions should be observed to be treated in private hospitals
while patients with many complicating conditions should be observed to be
treated in public hospitals. In addition, as it is often the case that patients
can insure against treatment costs in private hospitals, patients with few
15
complicating conditions should be observed to be privately insured while
those with many complicating conditions should be uninsured. Given data
availability, testing the predictions of this model provides a rich vein for
further research.
1620
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